



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
UNITED STATES ARMY INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY COMMAND
FREEDOM OF INFORMATION/PRIVACY OFFICE
FORT GEORGE G. MEADE, MARYLAND 20755-5995

4

REPLY TO
ATTENTION OF:

March 25, 2002

Freedom of Information/
Privacy Office

Mr. John Young
CRYPTOME
251 West 89th Street
Suite 6E
New York, New York 10024

Dear Mr. Young:

References:

- a. Your Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request of March 29, 2001, for records concerning various dossiers. Your request was received in this office on April 18, 2001.
- b. Our letter of April 20, 2001, informing you that additional time was needed to review the records and we were unable to comply the 20-day statutory time limit in processing your request.

We have conducted checks of the automated Defense Clearance and Investigations Index and a search of the Investigative Records Repository to determine the existence of Army intelligence investigative records responsive to your request. The records are enclosed for your use.

We have located the enclosed records pertaining to Cuba Intelligence Services Organization, ZF400247W. We have completed a mandatory declassification review in accordance with Executive Order (EO) 12958. As a result of our review, information has been sanitized and 95 pages of records are denied in their entirety as the information is currently and properly classified SECRET and CONFIDENTIAL according to Sections 1.3(a)(2), 1.3(a)(3) and 3.4(b)(1) of EO 12958. This information is exempt from the public disclosure provisions of the FOIA pursuant to Title 5 U.S. Code 552(b)(1). It is not possible to reasonably segregate meaningful portions of the withheld pages for release. Fees for processing this request are waived. A brief explanation of the applicable sections follows:

Section 1.3(a)(2) of EO 12958 provides that information shall be classified SECRET if its unauthorized disclosure reasonably could be expected to cause serious damage to the national security.

Section 1.3(a)(3) of EO 12958 provides that information shall be classified CONFIDENTIAL if its unauthorized disclosure reasonably could be expected to cause damage to the national security

Section 3.4(b)(1) of EO 12958 provides that classified information more than 25 years old is exempt from automatic declassification if it would reveal the identity of a confidential human source, or reveal information about the application of an intelligence source or method, or reveal the identity of a human intelligence source when the unauthorized disclosure of that source would clearly and demonstrably damage the national security interests of the United States.

Since the release of the information deleted from these records would result in an unwarranted invasion of the privacy rights of the individuals concerned, this information is exempt from the public disclosure provisions of the FOIA pursuant to Title 5 U.S. Code 552 (b)(6).

The withholding of information by this office is a partial denial of your request. This denial is made on behalf of Major General Keith B. Alexander, the Commanding General, U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command, who is the Initial Denial Authority for Army intelligence investigative and security records under the FOIA. You may appeal this decision to the Secretary of the Army. If you wish to file an appeal, you should forward it to this office. Your appeal must be postmarked no later than 60 calendar days from the date of this letter. After the 60 day period, the case may be considered closed; however, such closure does not preclude you filing litigation in the courts.

Coordination had been completed and we have been informed by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) that information has been sanitized from the records pursuant to Title 5 U.S. Code 552 (b)(1) and (b)(3) of the FOIA. To aid you in identifying the CIA exempted information we have bracketed it in black.

The withholding of the information by the CIA constitutes a partial denial of your request and you have the right to appeal this decision to the Agency Review Panel within 45 days from the date of this letter. If you decide to file an appeal, it should be forwarded to the following: Ms. Kathryn I. Dyer, Information and Privacy Coordinator, Central Intelligence Agency, Washington, DC 20505. Please explain the basis of your appeal. Cite CIA F-1998-00926 assigned to your request so that it may be easily identified.


We have been informed by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) that 41 pages have been withheld in their entirety pursuant to Title 5 U.S. Code 552 (b)(1) of the FOIA. Information has also been sanitized from the records that is exempt from public disclosure pursuant to Title 5 U.S. Code 552 (b)(1), (b)(2), (b)(7C), (b)(7)(D) and (b)(7)(F). To aid you in identifying the FBI exempted information, we have bracketed it in black.

The withholding of the information by the FBI constitutes a partial denial of your request and you have the right to appeal this decision. If you decide to file an appeal, it should be sent to the Co-Director, Office of Information and Privacy, U.S. Department of Justice, Flag Building, Suite 570, Washington, DC 20530-0001 within 60 days from the date of this letter. The envelope and the letter should be clearly marked "Freedom of Information Appeal" or "Information Appeal". Please cite FBI FOI/PA #440012 assigned to your request so that it may be easily identified.

We are continuing to review records regarding other titles you have requested and will respond to you by separate correspondence when our review is complete.

If you have any questions concerning this action, feel free to contact Mrs. Reilly at (301) 677-4742. Please refer to case #770F-01.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink that reads "Russell A. Nichols". The signature is written in a cursive, slightly slanted style.

Russell A. Nichols
Chief, Freedom of Information/
Privacy Office

Enclosure

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DOSSIER NO. ZF-40 0247

As of 30 Aug 78 all material
(Date)

included in this file conforms with

DA policies currently in effect.

D. B. [Signature] 30 Aug 78
(Signature) (Date Signed)

D. B. [Printed Name] 5
(Printed Name) (Grade)

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111P
Form 315
1 Sep 72
[Signature]

Revised 10 Feb 1990

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Investigative Records Repository (IRR)
Reviewed for retention criteria UP
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Date: 30 Aug 78

NOTE: This document contains information affecting the national defense of the United States within the meaning of the espionage laws, Title 18, U.S.C., Sec. 793 and 794. The transmission or the revelation of its contents in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

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This report contains unprocessed information. Plans and/or policies should not be evolved or modified solely on the basis of this report.

1. COUNTRY: CUBA (CU); PANAMA (PN)

8. REPORT NUMBER: 2 231 0297 73
(2807)

2. SUBJECT: (U) Study on the DGI

9. DATE OF REPORT: 19 April 1973

3. ISC NUMBER:

10. NO. OF PAGES: 5

11. REFERENCES: DIRM 6B7e
IR 2 231 0261 73
IR 2 231 0233 73
IR 2 231 0438 72

4. DATE OF INFORMATION: 27 March 1973

12. ORIGINATOR: 470th MI Group, USARSO

5. PLACE AND DATE OF ACQ: Panama City, PN;
29 March 1973

13. PREPARED BY:

Chief, Special Operations Branch

6. EVALUATION: SOURCE B INFORMATION 2

14. APPROVING AUTHORITY:

7. SOURCE: 22310113

LTJ, MI
CDR, 470th MI Group

15. SUMMARY: (C/FO) Following is the translation of a study prepared by an unidentified member of the PN Guardia Nacional (GN - National Guard) (1) G-2 Section in March 1973 on the CU Direccion General de Inteligencia (DGI - General Directorate of Intelligence).

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TRANSLATION

BRIEF NOTES CONCERNING THE DGI OF THE REPUBLIC OF CUBA

PREFACE:

The DGI of the Republic of Cuba is not something which separates itself from the realities of today but instead is useful, according to its purposes, to Cuban Communism, its allies, and fellow travelers.

DGI is not the best apparatus of its type, but it can be considered as one of the top ten found in the world, and since its inception it has received assistance in furthering its development from certain indispensable elements among which are Communist Bloc advisors and sufficient economic resources to accomplish its goals. Today, DGI handles its own operations and conducts its own "projects," always in accordance with the political norms that are established by its organs, for example the Central Committee of the Cuban Communist Party, mostly under Moscow's guidance.

When dealing with the DGI, it must be considered as a highly skilled organization. Great care and caution should be taken when directing counterintelligence operations against the DGI.

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
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REPLACES DA FORM 1548, 1 AUG 67,
OPNAV FORM 3720 (Rev 10-67),
AF FORM 112, JUL 61, WHICH MAY BE
USED UNTIL 1 JAN 82.

1396

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~~NO FOREIGN DISSEM~~REPORT NO. 2 231 0297 73
PAGE 2 OF 5 PAGES
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470th MI Group, USARSO

THE ORGANIZATION

We are not going to analyze its organic structure, which changes according to operational necessities, but will rather point out the most useful facts that we can use which are as follows:

INSIDE CUBA: The headquarters is operated, receiving support from organizations such as:

- 1) Department of State Security (DSE) - functions as the Political Police.
- 2) The Technical Investigations Department of the National Police - this is the Criminal Police force.
- 3) The Committee for the Defense of the Revolution (CDR) - this is a massive national organization at the neighborhood level for surveillance purposes.

The above organizations not only support the operations of the DGI, but they also serve for recruitment and selection of personnel; additionally, they provide security support to foreign personnel who receive training in CU and who will be employed by the DGI in foreign countries. The Ministries of Defense and Interior work very closely (with DGI) and the Ministry of Foreign Relations is subordinate to them in DGI operations ordered by the Central Committee.

It must not be forgotten that operations of the DGI frequently are initiated and guided by the Prime Minister, who acts on his own initiative, without taking into account the Party or anybody else.

OUTSIDE CUBA: The true function of the DGI is operations in foreign countries. Even though Cuba is a small country, its operational sphere is not limited just to Latin America, but it encompasses many areas as distant as Asia. We can say that their priorities are the following:

- 1) Latin America: Operations in general.
- 2) Central and South Africa: Operations in general.
- 3) Europe: Propaganda and support.
- 4) Asia: Minor operational activities, propaganda and support.

There is no doubt that the greater number of their operations are in Latin America, where they operate both covertly and in the open, and where they support and receive support from the conventional Communist parties and other leftist parties and also receive support from armed movements, denominated "Liberation," some of which were founded by the DGI, and other direct or indirect support.

SOME METHODS AND GOALS:

There are many who believe that the DGI acts only in support of armed movements of Latin America and Africa with arms, finances, and training; however, this is only part of their operations, which reach into areas seldom imagined. For example, the DGI has joint operations with teams from the intelligence services of the Communist Bloc. They collect information and exchange information in accordance with operational necessity.

In some countries, where insurrection is not possible because of political, social, economic, military, or geographic reasons, other means are used to obtain their goals, the following being their principal targets:

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PAGE 3 OF 5 PAGES
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- A. Political parties affiliated with them or who are unaligned
- B. Universities
- C. Secondary Schools
- D. Culture and Sports Institutes
- E. Press and Radio
- F. Mass Movements (People's Movements)
- G. Workers Unions
- H. Ministries of Defense
- I. Ministries of Foreign Relations
- J. Ministries of the Interior

Their goal is invariably the same - to induce or bring about a fervent nationalism (which gets out of control) in order to be able to extract the most benefit from it. Involved in all of these are persons and interested individuals who act without the full knowledge of what is involved. In many cases, some of those involved act in good faith believing that they are doing something patriotic and even humane, but the end is their own destruction. We cannot forget Lenin, who said, "The end justifies the means." In fact, the most notorious activities of the DGI have been interventions in the affairs of foreign countries through its operational teams within and without the so-called "liberation armies." However, these are only the activities best known.

THEIR OPERATIONS:

1) EMBASSIES: Where there is a Cuban embassy, their operational possibilities are much better; and where there is none, they create cultural and/or sports missions in order to arrive there, or they take advantage of some human weakness to make their contacts and develop subsequent operations.

2) INFORMATION AGENCIES: Prensa Latina is invariably a part of the political team, therefore part of DGI.

3) CLANDESTINE AGENTS: This is the most difficult area for any security service of the less developed countries which possess fewer resources when attempting to counteract DGI operations. Without any doubt, the countries that are affected one way or another by the DGI need informational support and need to consult their allies, the same way that is done by the Communist Bloc services. It is not possible to be very effective against highly trained personnel with resources and predetermined goals without the support of an interested ally. Generally, the most powerful services with experience and economic resources have information about elements which at our level, and with the means we have at hand, would appear as ordinary merchants, tourists or athletes.

THE OPERATORS: These may appear in many roles but they are members of DGI and work in well chosen and trained teams. In the countries where the DGI works it often becomes necessary for the DGI to use native-born personnel, but do not forget that they have trained hundreds of Latin Americans in past years, and out of these they have made their selections and recruitments. In intensive operations they have had 13 years of accumulated experience.

Time has made the operations of DGI agents more effective. For years

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REPORT NO. 2 231 0297 73

PAGE 4

OF 5

PAGES

ORIGINATOR

470th MI Group, USARSO

they have been establishing and preparing support points, using the personnel who have travelled to Cuba and their diplomatic missions, both accredited and non-accredited. In the Americas (Latin America), they have advanced their plans, because they have established new embassies located in strategic localities where they can best operate. Even before they arrive in a country, they can count on local support, be it Communist Parties, People's Parties and/or Workers' Parties, and other similar types. Even the active or inactive armed movements provide them with help.

DISGUISES/COVER STORIES

- 1) Diplomats
- 2) Mission Executives (many types)
- 3) News reporters
- 4) Merchants
- 5) Photographers with Laboratories
- 6) Agronomists
- 7) Technicians in the Fishing Industries

And in accordance with the customs of the country, they establish themselves in cover functions such as:

- a) Travel Service Agencies
- b) Photographic Laboratories
- c) Small retail merchants
- d) Students (This is not frequently done; usually they use other covers.)
- e) Peasants in critical areas who provide support to Armed Movements.

TARGETS: They appear above, under the sub-title: SOME METHODS AND GOALS.

EMPLOYMENT THAT CANNOT BE DISCARDED:

It is possible that the DGI is using some Cubans or natives of the countries where they are operating who have not been in Cuba for 15 to 20 years but, nevertheless, are sympathizers of the Cuban Revolution. Also there are the few foreign sympathizers who listen only to Radio Habana and receive their propaganda. In other instances it could be an "exile" who was purposefully sent abroad in order to facilitate his placement.

Without previously obtained and collected information it is not possible to develop any operation of value. In a case such as this one might, by chance, make sporadic hits, but these would provide only 10% return on their true value.

JOINT OPERATIONS:

A very dangerous and difficult activity for small agencies to carry out and which renders small inefficient returns is the joint operation, as is the custom between Cubans, Russians, Czechs, East Germans, and Red Chinese. These joint operations strengthen and increase the capabilities of the intelligence services that have missions in predetermined places. The natives of the target country ignore the fact that they are working for elements of the Communist Bloc, be they Russians, Communist Chinese, Cubans,

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REPORT NO. 2 231 0297 73

PAGE 5 OF 5 PAGES

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or others. Generally, these intelligence services do not give anything unless they get at least a 70% return from the operations, which they must handle directly or from behind the scenes.

END TRANSLATION

PREPARER'S COMMENTS: (CONFIDENTIAL)

The GN G-2 study on the DGI is somewhat superficial, but the fact that it was done indicates that there might be an effort by the G-2 to learn more about the DGI now that there is an influx of Cubans visiting PN for various reasons. GN G-2 LTC Manuel A. NORIEGA has himself been the principal host to Norberto HERNANDEZ Curbelo during numerous trips to PN. HERNANDEZ has a history of being a member of the DGI but describes himself as an official of the Cuban Foreign Ministry. During HERNANDEZ's latest stay in PN, from January to March 1973, he had the use of a GN C-2 vehicle and it was reported that among his various activities, he headed a Cuban advisory team to the PN Departamento Nacional de Investigaciones (DENI - National Department of Investigation)(2) (see referenced IR's 2231026173 and 2231023373). Other known or suspected DGI officials who have been in PN during 1972-73, with the full knowledge of the GN G-2, include Alfredo GARCIA Almeida and Arqueles MORALES Mendoza, who is the current Prensa Latina (Cuban news agency) representative in PN (see referenced IR 2231043872).

FOOTNOTES: (U)

(1) GN - the army and police force of PN

(2) DENI - the secret police of PN, under the control of the GN since late 1968

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DD FORM 1396c

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REPLACES DA FORM 1396, 1 AUG 61

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5 USC 552a (b) (1)

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Information originated with another government agency. It has been referred to them for review and direct response to you.



Information originated with one or more government agencies. We are coordinating to determine the releasability of information under their purview. Upon completion of our coordination, we will advise you of their decision.

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Page(s) 7-44



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF FOR INTELLIGENCE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20315

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ACSI-CIPC

9 OCT 1989

SUBJECT: Letter of Transmittal (U)

Director of Investigations
United States Army Intelligence Command
PO Box 398
Fort Holabird, Maryland 21219

~~(C)~~ Attached []

forwarded for your information and retention.

FOR THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF FOR INTELLIGENCE

Joseph A. Weyrick

JOSEPH W. WEYRICK
Colonel, GS
Actg Dep Dir of Counterintelligence

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5USC 552 (b) (1)
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UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No. MM 105-3348

Miami, Florida

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RE: INTELLIGENCE MATTERS - CUBA
INTERNAL SECURITY - CUBA

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ENCLOSURE

65-634

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RE: INTELLIGENCE MATTERS - CUBA

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
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UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Miami, Florida

In Reply, Please Refer to

File No. MM 105-3348

DEC 1 1963

[Handwritten signature]

Title INTELLIGENCE MATTERS - CUBA

Character INTERNAL SECURITY - CUBA

Reference memorandum, dated and captioned
as above, at Miami, Florida.

All sources (except any listed below) whose identities
are concealed in referenced communication have furnished reliable
information in the past.

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UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
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Miami, Florida

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Section 552

Section 552a

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☐ (j)(2)

☐ (b)(3)

☐ (b)(7)(C)

☐ (k)(1)

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☐ (b)(7)(E)

☐ (k)(3)

☐ (b)(7)(F)

☐ (k)(4)

☐ (b)(4)

☐ (b)(8)

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☐ (b)(9)

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Army 836F Document 209 (pp. 2-7)

pg 92-97

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INTELLIGENCE MATTERS - CUBA

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
98

CONFIDENTIAL

- 8* -

[Handwritten signature]

(b1)
For
FBI



UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

105-21188

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

Chicago, Illinois
JULY 29, 1966

624198
CLASSIFIED BY 39063 EKL/MT
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X-6

CUBAN INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Reference is made to the memorandum of the Chicago
Office of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) dated
May 31, 1966, and captioned as above.

On June 24, 1966,

Chicago, Illinois, advised a Special
Agent of the FBI that [redacted] to whom he had referred
previously, had returned to Chicago and was residing at [redacted]

On July 20, 1966,

[redacted] advised as follows:

This document contains neither recommendations
nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property
of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and
its contents are not to be distributed outside
your agency.

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89 MAY 2 1973

ENCLOSURE

CONFIDENTIAL
Group 1

Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

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CUBAN INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

While in Cuba he was a member of an organization known as Union Nacional de Integracion Revolucionaria (UNIR). This organization was composed of thousands of members and was led by one Julio (Last Name Unknown) (LNU), a Cuban now serving a prison sentence in Cuba for anti-Castro activities. The organization engaged in anti-Castro activities and clandestinely published and distributed a paper known as "Mentires de un Traidor" ("Lies of a Traitor"). This paper published names and carried photographs of individuals who were supporting the Castro regime of Cuba. The organization is now believed to be defunct with most of its leadership either in prison in Cuba or in exile in the United States.

He was suspected by the Cuban Government of being involved in anti-Castro activities and was arrested and interrogated on several occasions by Cuban authorities. He therefore fled Cuba and entered the United States in October, 1962, as mentioned above.

Since coming to the United States he became a member of "Unidad Revolucionario" which he described as an anti-Castro type organization. This organization is no longer in existence in the Chicago area.

He is acquainted with [

[] He was of the understanding that [] by virtue of his employment, had occasion to visit various Cuban military bases.

He [] has no first-hand knowledge of groups being infiltrated by the Cuban Government into Latin America for subversive purposes, but has heard rumors of such activities. He also heard rumors regarding the construction of small boats in various cities of Cuba for such purposes, but could not furnish any specifics. He could not furnish any information regarding any Cuban subversive groups entering the United

100
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CUBAN INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

States. He could not provide any information regarding agents of the Cuban Intelligence Service either in the United States or Cuba. (b1)
(b2)

On June 8, 1966, and June 9, 1966, [] with whom sufficient contact has not been had to determine reliability, advised as follows:

(b1)

For
FB

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
FOIPA
DELETED PAGE INFORMATION SHEET

2 Page(s) withheld entirely at this location in the file. One or more of the following statements, where indicated, explain this deletion.

- ☒ Deletions were made pursuant to the exemptions indicated below with no segregable material available for release to you.

Section 552

Section 552a

☒ (b)(1)

☐ (b)(7)(A)

☐ (d)(5)

☐ (b)(2)

☐ (b)(7)(B)

☐ (j)(2)

☐ (b)(3)

☐ (b)(7)(C)

☐ (k)(1)

☐ (b)(7)(D)

☐ (k)(2)

☐ (b)(7)(E)

☐ (k)(3)

☐ (b)(7)(F)

☐ (k)(4)

☐ (b)(4)

☐ (b)(8)

☐ (k)(5)

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☐ (b)(9)

☐ (k)(6)

☐ (b)(6)

☐ (k)(7)

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- ☒ The following number is to be used for reference regarding these pages:

Army 8364 Document 210 (pp. 4, 5)

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102-103

Freedom of Information Act/Privacy Act
Deleted Page(s) Information Sheet

Indicated below are one or more statements which provide a brief rationale for the deletion of this page.



Information has been withheld in its entirety in accordance with the following exemption(s):

5 USC 552a (b) (1)

It is not reasonable to segregate meaningful portions of the record for release.



Information pertains solely to another individual with no reference to you and/or the subject of your request.



Information originated with another government agency. It has been referred to them for review and direct response to you.




Information originated with one or more government agencies. We are coordinating to determine the releasability of information under their purview. Upon completion of our coordination, we will advise you of their decision.

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NO DUPLICATION FEE
FOR THIS PAGE

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104-115



~~SECRET~~
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Miami, Florida

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

JAN 22 1963

610991

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
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RE: INTELLIGENCE MATTERS - CUBA
INTERNAL SECURITY - CUBA

8/12/98
CLASSIFIED BY 39043 EMB/AT
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 6

On January 15, 1963, [] a Cuban exile who receives correspondence from well placed contacts in Cuba and who has furnished reliable information in the past, advised that about two years ago he received information from a Cuban citizen employed in Havana, Cuba, [] that the following individuals had been recruited [] for training in the Foreign Relations School in about March, 1961, in Havana:

[]
[]
[]
[]
[]

1597/X

(b7C)
(b7D) For
(b7F) FBI

[] said that his Havana source furnished substantiating evidence by letter advising [] that [] submitted a letter of resignation dated March 30, 1961, [] explaining that he had been ordered to the Foreign Service School of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; that he must be tested in the Sierra Maestra; and later would take an intensive course in the Foreign Service School following instruction of their revolutionary leader, Dr. Fidel Castro. At that time [] was serving as Coordinator at []

[] said that he has now received information from his source in Havana that [] is now in Ghana, [] is now in Holland, and [] is now in Switzerland, each being attached to the Cuban Foreign Service.

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116

Army #211

Cuban ... in ...

~~SECRET~~

RE: INTELLIGENCE MATTERS - CUBA
INTERNAL SECURITY - CUBA


565

(b1)
For
FBI

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- 2* -



UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

Miami, Florida
JAN 15 1963

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE
INTELLIGENCE MATTERS - CUBA
INTERNAL SECURITY - CUBA
CLASSIFIED BY 390638W/1
DECLASSIFY ON 25X 6
8/11/98
240

(62) [a Cuban exile who is acquainted with certain aspects of both pro and anti-FIDEL CASTRO activities, and who maintains contact with some individuals still residing in Cuba, advised on January 7, 1963 he had received this information from a former official of the Cuban government prior to FIDEL CASTRO, whom he considers to be reliable. that a []

For
FBI

[(S)]

[(S)]

(61)

For
FBI

[(S)]

[(S)]

~~SECRET~~

Army # 212

Cuban Intelligence Activities

~~SECRET~~

INTELLIGENCE MATTERS - CUBA

[

Just


(b1)
Per
FBI

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- 2 *

~~SECRET~~



UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No. 105-3348

Miami, Florida

~~SECRET~~
(p. 5, 6, 7)

Re: INTELLIGENCE MATTERS -

CLASSIFIED BY 39063 EWD/DCM-CUBA
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X6
(C/B/F/B) RHD

Background of Informant

The following information was furnished on
October 4, 1962, by [] an individual with whom no
previous contact has been had, but who was a member of
[]

[] In 1957 he began to
work against the regime of FULGENCIO BATISTA. He stated
he never belonged to the July 26 Movement, but stated he
worked closely with [] who was an organizer of
the July 26 Movement in Oriente.

[] He stated this
brother has to perform guard duty as a militiaman, but
none of his immediate relatives are any longer pro-
CASTRO.

7
(b2)
(b7C)
(b7D)
(b7E)
per
FBI

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120
65-65

ENCLOSURE

Army # 213

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
FOIPA
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Section 552

Section 552a

☒ (b)(1)

☐ (b)(7)(A)

☐ (d)(5)

☐ (b)(2)

☐ (b)(7)(B)

☐ (j)(2)

☐ (b)(3)

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☐ (b)(7)(D)

☐ (k)(2)

☐ (b)(7)(E)

☐ (k)(3)

☐ (b)(7)(F)

☐ (k)(4)

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☐ (b)(8)

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☐ (k)(7)

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- ☒ The following number is to be used for reference regarding these pages:

Army 836 F Document 213 (p. 2-6)

pg 121-125

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INTELLIGENCE MATTERS - CUBA

E. A. R. L. L.

(b1)
For
FBI

[] who entered the United States at Key West, Florida, on a boat in the first part of September, 1962, was formerly a Captain in the Cuban national revolutionary police. His father is the []

[] stated these individuals have sacked and pillaged the houses and property of many people because they were anti-CASTRO. He stated they are opportunists and communism was perfectly acceptable to them as long as they were living well and receiving promotions.

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
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126

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UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

Miami, Florida
May 18, 1962

105-3348

RE: INTELLIGENCE MATTERS - CUBA
INTERNAL SECURITY - CUBA

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5/12/98
CLASSIFIED BY 39063 EWT
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Cuba... Intelligence Activities

(b1)

For
FB

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127

Army # 214

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
FOIPA
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4

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Section 552

Section 552a

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Army 8365 Document 214 (pp. 2-5)

pgs 128-131

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INTELLIGENCE MATTERS - CUBA

(61)
For
FBI

(S)

Shortly after the overthrow of BATISTA, the revolutionary government of FIDEL CASTRO named Major EPIGENIO AMEIJERAS DELGADO as Chief of the National Revolutionary Police. This individual is also referred to as "LA YERBITA," (The Little Herb), due to his addiction to marijuana smoking. [] stated this individual has been a source of embarrassment on several occasions to the Communist government of Cuba. In the first place his general poor moral character was against him; shortly after becoming Chief of the National Revolutionary Police, he was married in the Catholic Church, which was also distasteful to CASTRO. He also made public statements on several occasions denouncing Communism and denying that he or the revolutionary government of Cuba was in any way affiliated with Communism after it was no longer fashionable for the Cuban Revolutionary Government to deny its Communist connections and close alliance with Soviet bloc countries.

(62)
For
FBI

Actually, since the early summer of 1961, when AMEIJERAS was sent to Czechoslovakia and a tour of various European countries, he has not had any command, in fact, of what was the Cuban National Revolutionary Police. This police body is now directly under the command of RAMIRO VALDES MENENDEZ. 1597... VALDES was the original head of Cuban G-2, under the direct command of the Cuban Minister of Defense RAUL CASTRO, but since the late summer of 1961 he has been designated Minister of the Interior, and is also referred to as Minister of Public Order.

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Section 552

Section 552a

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☐ (b)(7)(D)

☐ (k)(2)

☐ (b)(7)(E)

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Army 836F Document 214 (pp. 7-13)

pg 133-139

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INTELLIGENCE MATTERS - CUBA

(b1)
FOR
FBI

[] who is acquainted with numerous Cuban government officials and with some Cabinet members, has reported several times in the past on RAMON AJA CASTRO, described by him as head of the Departamento de Asuntos Latino Americanos (Department of Latin American Affairs) (BALA). This source reported on April 2, 1962 that RAMON AJA CASTRO had been named Minister Plenipotentiary to Bolivia, and probably went there during the first part of March, 1962. This source had described AJA CASTRO as a man backed by Assistant Secretary of State CARLOS OLIVARES SANCHEZ, and noted that each time AJA CASTRO traveled through Latin America, his visits were followed by demonstrations against the U.S. and U.S. owned companies. Source noted that AJA CASTRO visited Latin America with OLIVARES SANCHEZ just prior to the conference at Punta del Este and just prior to the violent anti-U.S. demonstrations which took place in some Latin American countries.

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140
~~SECRET~~

(b7C)
(b7D)
(b7F)
FOR
FBI

~~SECRET~~

INTELLIGENCE MATTERS - CUBA

(b1)(s) [] arrived in the U.S. on May 8, 1962. He resides at [] He advised on May 14, 1962 that Captain VICTOR ALDANA is the present Acting Chief of the DTI, formerly headed by Major RAUL DIAZ ARGUELLES. He stated this individual is receiving indoctrination in Communist theory at an academy in Matanzas Province. He confirmed that EPICENIO AMELJEIRAS is no longer Chief of the DOP. This source, [] advised that in his opinion ABELARDO COLOME IBARRA is actually running the DOP under the director orders of RAMIRO VALDES.

~~SECRET~~

INTELLIGENCE MATTERS - CUBA

(b1)
For
FBI

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- 16 *

142

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Page(s) 143-144

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- 1 - Yellow file cop.
- 1 - Section tickler

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DECLASSIFY ON: 25X G.I.
(8/3/98) (LHD)

November 22, 1961

LATIN-AMERICAN ACTIVITIES

(S)

(S) (S) Intelligence Matters-Cuba, IS-Cuba)

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For
FBI
MAILED 2
NOV 22 1961
COMM-FBI

- RECE
- Tolson _____
 - Belmont _____
 - Mohr _____
 - Callahan _____
 - Conrad _____
 - DeLoach _____
 - Evans _____
 - Malone _____
 - Rosen _____
 - Sullivan _____
 - Tavel _____
 - Trotter _____
 - Tele. Room _____
 - Ingram _____
 - Gandy _____

NOV 28 1961 TELETYPE UNIT

EX-113 REC 28
NOV 22 1961
CONFIDENTIAL
145
Army #215

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XXXXXXFEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
FOIPA
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Section 552Section 552a☒ (b)(1)☐ (b)(7)(A)☐ (d)(5)☐ (b)(2)☐ (b)(7)(B)☐ (j)(2)☐ (b)(3)☐ (b)(7)(C)☐ (k)(1)☐ (b)(7)(D)☐ (k)(2)☐ (b)(7)(E)☐ (k)(3)☐ (b)(7)(F)☐ (k)(4)☐ (b)(4)☐ (b)(8)☐ (k)(5)☐ (b)(5)☐ (b)(9)☐ (k)(6)☐ (b)(6)☐ (k)(7)

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Army 836 F Document 215 (p. 2)

pg 146

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~~SECRET~~

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

105-3348

CLASSIFIED BY 39063ELW/Dcm
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X/6
(6/10/98) RAD

Miami, Florida

NOV 6 1961

Re: Intelligence Matters - Cuba

The following information was furnished by [redacted] on October 29, 1961. [redacted] is a former Cuban investigator who recently arrived from Havana, Cuba. This source has furnished reliable information in the past.

(b2)
FOR
FBI

(S)

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FOR
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ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

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FOR
FBI

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
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Section 552

Section 552a

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- ☒ The following number is to be used for reference regarding these pages:

Bring 836F Document 216 (p. 2-14)

pg 148 - 160

XXXXXX
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XXXXXX

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X Deleted Page(s) X
X No Duplication Fee X
X for this page X
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

Re: Intelligence Matters - Cuba

C

181

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(b1)
For
FBI

- 15* -

161

Freedom of Information Act/Privacy Act
Deleted Page(s) Information Sheet

Indicated below are one or more statements which provide a brief rationale for the deletion of this page.

- ☒ Information has been withheld in its entirety in accordance with the following exemption(s):


6 USC 552a (b) (1)

It is not reasonable to segregate meaningful portions of the record for release.

- ☐ Information pertains solely to another individual with no reference to you and/or the subject of your request.
- ☐ Information originated with another government agency. It has been referred to them for review and direct response to you.
- ☐ Information originated with one or more government agencies. We are coordinating to determine the releasability of the information under their purview. Upon completion of our coordination, we will advise you of their decision.

DELETED PAGE(S)
NO DUPLICATION FEE
FOR THIS PAGE.

Page(s) 162-163



~~SECRET~~

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
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6/23/98

CLASSIFIED BY 39063 ELW/MT
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 6

105-3547

RHD

Miami, Florida

March 8, 1961

CUBAN INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
IN THE UNITED STATES
INTELLIGENCE MATTERS - CUBA

He admitted that he returned to Cuba in 1959 to resume his career in the Cuban Navy but deserted and returned to the United States, arriving Key West, Florida, December 28, 1960.

he was able to determine that the agency in charge of all intelligence investigations outside of Cuba itself is Cuban G-2. He stated that when FIDEL CASTRO was fighting former President, FULGENCIO BATISTA, the principal investigative agency of the Revolutionary Army was DIER (Department of Investigation of the Revolutionary Army) which later became

(b7C)
(b7D)
(b7F)

FOR
FBI

164

Army #217

~~SECRET~~

RE: CUBAN INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

the DIFAR (Department of Investigation of the Revolutionary Armed Forces), which in turn became known as Cuban G-2. He advised that under the current agreement between the various Cuban investigative agencies, G-2 is the only agency authorized to conduct intelligence investigations outside of Cuba proper. G-2 also serves as a central depository for all investigative reports.

He advised that RAMIRO VALDEZ is head of the Cuban G-2 and that JOSE PAZ NOVAS was at that time the head of Cuban G-2 in Miami. JOSE PAZ NOVAS, a self-admitted head of G-2 in the Miami area until April, 1960, publicly defected from the CASTRO regime in September, 1960.

(b7c)
(b7D)
(b7F)

For
FBI

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(b1)
For
FBI

- 2 -

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165

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RE: CUBAN INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

[] stated that JOSE ABRAHANTES in 1959 was the personal representative of RAMIRO VALDEZ. [] further advised that he read in the Cuban newspaper, "REVOLUCION" that JOSE ABRAHANTES had gone to the USSR to take a special course of instructions.

[] also advised that Dr. FRANCISCO ALVAREZ is related by marriage to RAMIRO VALDEZ. [] stated that Dr. ALVAREZ' wife is either a sister or close relative of RAMIRO VALDEZ.

[] advised that the local police are and have been under the supervision of Chief EFIGENIO AMELJEIRAS since the inception of CASTRO's government. He advised that the department is divided into two divisions, the DTI (The Technical Investigative Department), headed by RAUL DIAZ ARGUELLES, and the Secret Police (La Policia Confidencia 2-A). Regarding the latter [] stated there have been numerous individuals in charge of this section of the Secret Police but he could not recall their names.

[] stated that the DTI investigates violations of a general criminal nature but not those of a political or intelligence nature. The latter investigations are handled by the Secret Police.

[] further advised that BIN was dissolved by RAMIRO VALDEZ in October, 1959, and replaced by G-2 - Naval.

[] believes the same conditions exist today, the jurisdiction of BIN or G-2 Naval is limited to investigations of violations

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For
FBI

- 3 -
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
RE: CUBAN INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

committed by Naval personnel only and restricted to Cuba itself. [

[] further reported that two additional investigative agencies are in existence; the first is the Maritime Police, which investigates violations of a criminal nature on the water front, such as illegal traffic in drugs, smuggling, etc., and the second agency is the Bureau of Internal Revenue (Seguradid Fiscal), which investigates violations of the tax laws [] could not furnish names of the individuals who head the Maritime Police or the Bureau of Internal Revenue. [] emphasized the fact that all investigative agencies mentioned above are required to send copies of their reports to the headquarters of the Cuban G-2 whether they are of a general criminal nature or of a political nature.

[] his duties did not bring him into contact with G-2 agents, so that he was unable to furnish the names of G-2 agents dispatched to the United States or other countries. He did know, however, that JOSE PAZ NOVAS was head of G-2 in Miami because of the remark made by RAMIRO VALDEZ. He was also able to determine that Commandante (FNU) RINEJRO, aka "Red Beard," and Commandante (FNU) FURY held responsible positions with G-2 in Cuba.

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UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

New York, New York
December 5, 1960

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DECLASS. ON: 25X L.G.
(6/4/98) PHD
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Re: Cuban Intelligence Activities
in the United States

(b1)
For
FBI

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[]
(S)
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J(S)

3 XEROX
DEC 13 1960
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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

105-80787-267

ENCLOSURE

168

Army # 218

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
FOIPA
DELETED PAGE INFORMATION SHEET

2 Page(s) withheld entirely at this location in the file. One or more of the following statements, where indicated, explain this deletion.

☒ Deletions were made pursuant to the exemptions indicated below with no segregable material available for release to you.

Section 552

Section 552a

☒ (b)(1)

☐ (b)(7)(A)

☐ (d)(5)

☐ (b)(2)

☐ (b)(7)(B)

☐ (j)(2)

☐ (b)(3)

☐ (b)(7)(C)

☐ (k)(1)

☐ (b)(7)(D)

☐ (k)(2)

☐ (b)(7)(E)

☐ (k)(3)

☐ (b)(7)(F)

☐ (k)(4)

☐ (b)(4)

☐ (b)(8)

☐ (k)(5)

☐ (b)(5)

☐ (b)(9)

☐ (k)(6)

☐ (b)(6)

☐ (k)(7)

☐ Information pertained only to a third party with no reference to the subject of your request or the subject of your request is listed in the title only.

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☒ The following number is to be used for reference regarding these pages:

Army 836# Document 218 (pp. 2, 3)

pg 169-170

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C O N F I D E N T I A L

Re: Cuban Intelligence Activities
in the United States

(b1)
For
FBI

J(s)

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recommendations nor conclusions
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C O N F I D E N T I A L

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- 4 -

171



~~SECRET~~
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

New York, New York
December 5, 1960

Re: Cuban Intelligence Activities
in the United States

Reference is made to memorandum, dated and captioned
as above.

Contact with ~~(K)~~
to determine reliability.

It has been insufficient

(b2)
FOR
FBI

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105-81782-267

ENCLOSURE

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**UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION**

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No. 105-1998

CONFIDENTIAL

Miami, Florida
September 28, 1960

RE: CUBAN INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

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4 4 MAY 25 1973


173
CONFIDENTIAL

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- 1* -

Army # 21

105-80787-216
ENCLOSURE



UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

422 Federal Office Building
Civic Center
San Francisco 2, California

SECRET

June 27, 1960

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RE: CUBAN INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

The "San Francisco Examiner" of Sunday, June 12, 1960, carried in its "American Weekly" magazine section, an item captioned "We Were Wrong About Castro," which is written under the byline of STANLEY ROSS, Editor of "El Diario de Nueva York." This article reads in part as follows: N.Y.

"Castro's news agency, 'Prensa Latina,' spends millions to discredit the United States abroad. Its Board of Directors headed by an Argentine communist consists of two Russians from Tass, a pair of Yugoslavs, two Chinese communists, a Chilean Comintern member, and two Cuban reds. Its correspondents traveling throughout the hemisphere on Cuban diplomatic passports do espionage for Fidel and his communist partners. 'Prensa Latina' has offices and correspondents in New York, Washington, Chicago, Los Angeles, San Francisco, Miami, Denver and Atlanta -- and not one single daily newspaper in the United States."

CUBAN NATIONAL

The observations of [redacted] San Francisco, California, and [redacted] San Francisco, concerning this article were solicited and obtained on June 15, 1960.

was a pro-Castro organization.

CALIF.

CUBAN NATIONAL

[redacted] was also closely acquainted with CAMILLO CIENFUEGOS, who became Comandante of the Cuban Armed Forces following CASTRO's assuming authority. CIENFUEGOS has not been heard from since his plane disappeared on a flight over Cuba in October 1959.

[redacted] advised that he had not read the newspaper article, at which time the portion set out above was read to him and he said he considered it an effort at sensationalism on the part of the author. He advised that "Prensa Latina" is the

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174

For
FBI

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(b7f)

226

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

official news agency of the Cuban Government in Havana.

(b1)
For
FBI
[] (S)

[] (S)

(b1)
For
FBI
[] said he read the newspaper item set forth above which was attributed to STANLEY ROSS, Editor of the New York Spanish language newspaper, "El Diario de Nueva York." He stated that the author appears to assume that all Cuban Consulates are gathering espionage information for CASTRO since there are Consulates in just about every city mentioned in the article. []

[] (S)

(b1)
For
FBI
[] Regarding the extent of communist infiltration of the Board of Directors of "Prensa Latina," in Havana, as reflected in the newspaper article, [] is not in a position to comment.

(b1)
For
FBI
[] (S)

[] (S)

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UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

~~SECRET~~
SECRET

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

February 10, 1960

Re: CUBAN INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
IN THE UNITED STATES

1. CUBAN POLICE AGENCIES WHICH SEND AGENTS TO THE UNITED STATES:

A. G-2 - Army Intelligence:

[] ^{HEAD OF} advised G-2 of Military Intelligence from a security standpoint is over all other police agencies in Cuba and is headed by RAMIRO VALDES, a former commander of the military zone of Las Villas in the early days of the FIDEL CASTRO government. On November 5, 1959, [] reported that RAMIRO VALDES is a Communist. On March 20, 1959, [] advised that VALDES is a Communist.

B. Confidential "A":

According to [] this section of the Cuban National Police was formerly the Department of Logistics which was dissolved and most of its personnel absorbed into Confidential "A". This section until recently was located in the Department of Technical Investigations but now occupies part of the quarters which house the old police jefatura (Police Headquarters). HECTOR COSTA QUINONES, former head of the now defunct Department of Logistics, advised [] in the Spring and Summer of 1959 that this department had various agents working in the United States. He informed [] that this department was primarily interested in infiltrating counterrevolutionary groups and in determining if arms smuggling from the United States to Cuba was being effected and if any arms so smuggled were destined for the overthrow of the Cuban Revolutionary Government.

C. Department of Investigations of the Revolutionary Army - DIER:

This is the group most frequently referred to publicly in the press as the investigative organization making arrests of individuals engaged in counterrevolutionary activities.

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EXCEPT

- 1 -

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176

737-
Army #221

Re: CUBAN INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES IN THE UNITED STATES

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2. CUBAN POLICE SENT TO THE UNITED STATES:

RENE MIGUEL VALDES is a self admitted captain in G-2 and identified himself as such to [redacted] on September 2, 1959. He stated he was conducting investigations in the United States and that G-2 is controlled by RAMIRO VALDES, no relation. *For FBI* *U.S. info*

WILLIAM ALEXANDER MORGAN, a "major" in the Cuban Revolutionary Army and expatriate of the United States, was in contact with counter-revolutionary forces in the Miami area in July - August, 1959, and was the principal instrument in forming a trap which resulted directly in the apprehension of at least 200 persons in Cuba. This is a matter of public knowledge and as late as the end of January, 1960, MORGAN was still appearing as a star government witness in the trial of some of those accused of attempting to overthrow the Cuban Revolutionary Government. *For FBI* *U.S. info*

Some agents of the Department of Logistics who were reported by [redacted] on April 17, 1959, to be operating in the United States were the following: *For FBI* *U.S. info*

As reported above, the Department of Logistics was dissolved as of July 23, 1959, but some of its agents were absorbed into the DIER and Confidential "A", according to [redacted] *(b7D)* *(b7F)* *For FBI* *U.S. info*

J1(S) *For FBI*

J1(S)

-2-
~~SECRET~~ 177
~~SECRET~~

For FBI
(b7D)
OTHER AGENCY

~~SECRET~~
CUBAN INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES IN THE UNITED STATES

For FBI (61) OTHER
[] reported on January 15, 1960, that [] is a ^{cuba} DIKR ^{FBI} agent operating in Miami; that [] owner of the yacht [] is a Cuban intelligence agent but his usual profession is that of a contraband operator who has been selected to attempt to penetrate the counterrevolutionaries in the United States. [] also reported that [] as of January 15, 1960, was being instructed by RAMIRO VALDES, head of G-2, to proceed to Miami, Florida, via the "Golden Star," a 30-ton former Cuban sub chaser.


For FBI (67) (67P)
[] reported on January 6, 1960, that [] is a DIKR agent operating in New York. ^{cuba}

(61) For FBI
JIS
3. SCOPE OF OPERATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES:

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UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

February 20, 1960

Re: **OSMAN INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES IN
THE UNITED STATES**

Reference is made to the memorandum dated February 10,
1960, captioned as above. The following is evaluation of
sources used therein:

- (b2)
FOR
FBI
- ☒ [] Persons with whom insufficient contact
has been had to determine reliability but who were
in a position to furnish reliable information in
this matter.
- ☒ [] have furnished reliable
information in the past.
- ☒ [] Persons with whom insufficient contact has
been had to determine reliability.

(b1)

(b1)

OTHER
AGENCY
FOR
FBI

POOR QUALITY ORIGINAL

180

54

Central Intelligence Agency



Washington, D.C. 20505

1 May 2002

Mr. John Young
251 West 89th Street, Suite 6E
New York, NY 10024

Reference: F-2002-00433

Dear Mr. Young:

In the course of processing your 29 March 2001 Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request for information on the Cuban Intelligence Service, the Department of the Army located CIA material and referred it to us for review and direct response to you.

We have reviewed the material and have determined that it is properly classified and must be denied in its entirety on the basis of FOIA exemptions (b)(1) and (b)(3). An explanation of exemptions is enclosed.

You have the right to appeal this decision by addressing your appeal to the Agency Release Panel within 45 days from the date of this letter, in my care. Should you choose to do this, please explain the basis of your appeal.

Thank you for your patience while we were processing this referral.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Kathryn I. Dyer".

Kathryn I. Dyer
Information and Privacy Coordinator

Enclosure